Showing posts with label Prabowo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prabowo. Show all posts

Saturday, August 2, 2025

When Clemency become Currency: Prabowo and his Clemency Gambit

 


On 1 August, 2025, Thomas "Tom" Lembong stepped out of Cipinang Prison while Hasto Kristiyanto walked free from KPK detention, both beneficiaries of President Prabowo Subianto's clemency. But this wasn't mercy—it was the most audacious political transaction in Indonesia's democratic era, disguised as a gesture of national unity.

The timing tells the story. Hours after their release, PDI-P held its long-delayed sixth congress at Bali Nusa Dua Convention Centre, an event that had been postponed multiple times since 2024. The party couldn't very well proceed with its most important organisational gathering while its Secretary-General sat in prison. And Prabowo solved that problem with surgical precision, ensuring Hasto's freedom coincided exactly with the congress that would reshape Indonesia's political landscape.

By evening, the transformation was complete. Megawati Soekarnoputri, reconfirmed as PDI-P leader, instructed her cadres to support Prabowo's government—a stunning reversal for Indonesia's largest ‘opposition’ party. The choreography was flawless: prison to congress to coalition in a single day. This level of coordination doesn't happen by accident; it's the result of months of careful negotiation where clemency became the ultimate bargaining chip.

Yet the two cases that Prabowo chose to resolve reveal something more troubling than mere political horse-trading: Indonesia's justice system has become a weapon of political control, capable of both manufacturing crimes and forgiving real ones depending on the political needs of those in power.

Consider Hasto's case first. Here was textbook corruption: he was convicted of providing Rp 600 million in bribes to secure Harun Masiku's parliamentary seat, a direct monetary exchange to manipulate democratic processes. Cash changed hands. Electoral integrity was compromised. Democracy itself was corrupted. If this isn't worthy of punishment, what is?

Tom Lembong's case, however, tells a different and more disturbing story. The judges explicitly stated he "had no criminal intent" and "did not receive personal benefits" from his sugar import decisions. He wasn't required to pay restitution precisely because he gained nothing personally. His "crime" was violating administrative procedures by granting import permits to private companies instead of state-owned enterprises—a policy decision dressed up as corruption.

This wasn't justice; it was the criminalisation of governance. Legal experts warned that Tom's conviction was "dangerous because it blurs the lines between administrative errors and criminal acts”, creating a chilling effect where ministers might fear making any controversial decisions. When policy disagreements become criminal cases, democracy dies a slow death in courtrooms.

The contrast couldn't be starker: a genuine corruptor who paid bribes to steal legislative seats, and a technocrat prosecuted for following presidential directives on trade policy. Yet both walked free on the same day...

Prabowo's calculation was brilliant in its cynicism. By freeing Tom, he sent a message to every technocrat and business leader who felt victimised by Jokowi's weaponisation of the justice system: align with me, and your legal troubles disappear. By freeing Hasto, he unlocked the door to PDI-P's institutional power and voter base. Two clemency decisions, two constituencies captured.

The former president's shadow looms large over this transaction. Prabowo's 20 July visit to Jokowi now appears less like courtesy and more like political conditioning, ensuring his predecessor wouldn't object to decisions that effectively repudiated his legacy of legal intimidation. Both Tom and Hasto represented opposition to Jokowi's reign—Tom as the technocrat who helped Anies Baswedan and questioned economic orthodoxy, Hasto as the party operative who challenged presidential authority.

The speed of the entire process betrayed its political nature. The DPR approved both requests on July 31, just one day after receiving them, with consultations held behind closed doors rather than in public debate. Even the announcement came late on a Thursday evening, designed to minimise media attention and public scrutiny. 

What makes this gambit particularly audacious is how Prabowo weaponised Indonesia's most cherished narratives. Officials claimed this was about national unity for the country's 80th independence anniversary, invoking patriotic sentiment to cover political manoeuvring. But the real celebration wasn't Indonesia's birthday—it was PDI-P's congress, where a formerly imprisoned party leader could seamlessly take his place in a new political order.

Perhaps most revealing is what this decision says about Prabowo's governing philosophy. Rather than working through democratic institutions to build consensus, he's demonstrating that presidential prerogative can override judicial decisions when politically convenient. This concentration of power might seem benevolent when used to correct prosecutorial overreach, but it fundamentally weakens the institutional foundations of Indonesian democracy.

The contrast with his predecessor is telling. Where Jokowi used legal institutions to exclude and intimidate political opponents, Prabowo is using clemency to include and co-opt them. It's a different approach to the same fundamental problem: how to manage political opposition in a democratic system. The question is whether Prabowo's inclusionary strategy represents mature democratic leadership or simply a more sophisticated form of authoritarian control.

The broader pattern emerging suggests that Prabowo views political opposition not as a healthy democratic force to be engaged through policy debate, but as a problem to be managed through transactional relationships. This reduces democratic politics to elite deal-making rather than principled competition over governing vision—a reality starkly illustrated by the seamless transition from Hasto's prison cell to PDI-P's congress podium.

For now, two convicted men walk free—one who deserved prosecution but received clemency, another who received prosecution but deserved clemency. In the gap between these two injustices lies a troubling truth: it has become a system where law serves power rather than justice, where clemency becomes currency, and where the president's political needs ultimately trump the courts' legal decisions. Whether this represents the maturation of Indonesian democracy or its corruption may depend on what Prabowo does with the considerable power he has now consolidated in his hands.


Monday, April 7, 2025

New Publication: Protecting two presidents: legislative decline in Indonesia's post-2024 election transition


Happy to share our recently published article--as we watch legislative manipulation unfold before our very eyes in Indonesia, this research couldn't be more timely. We discuss how Indonesia's parliament has transformed from a check on executive power into a tool for undermining democratic norms under the facade of parliamentary procedure. 

https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/HZ2YUX5NIFZY4DTZJFXV/full?target=10.1080/13572334.2025.2484488 

Please let me know if the link doesn't work--am more than happy to send you the Pdf. 

Wednesday, March 26, 2025

Indonesia's Political Crisis: What Prabowo's Administration Failed to See Coming


 The political upheaval—indeed a crisis, if one dares to characterise it as such—that has engulfed Indonesia during the nascent stages of the current administration has spawned a multitude of theoretical interpretations warranting rigorous scrutiny. Three primary arguments demand our attention: first, that the widespread unrest and public demonstrations stem from a fundamental breakdown in governmental communication channels; second, that we are witnessing a profound crisis of leadership authenticity, with executive power effectively captured by the overwhelming interests of an expansive political coalition; and third, that a systemic rejection of meritocratic principles from the administration's inception has precipitated a devastating erosion of public confidence.

This analysis endeavours to methodically examine these critical variables, offering citizens a framework through which to comprehend the underlying causes of collective anxiety, organised protest, and pervasive disillusionment with President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka's governance.

Only through unflinching candour regarding recent events can we meaningfully dissect the manifestations of this political crisis that continues to unfold before us.


Structural Preconditions: The Political Inheritance

The Prabowo administration ascended to power upon a foundation of consequential political preconditions that significantly fortified its governing apparatus. First among these is the entrenchment of elite coalition supremacy. Marcus Mietzner, for example, meticulously documents how the presidential coalition evolved into an essential governance mechanism throughout President Joko Widodo's tenure (Mietzner 2023). President Jokowi demonstrated remarkable political dexterity in architecting an expansive coalition that effectively advanced executive priorities. This blueprint for coalition-building was subsequently bequeathed to his successor, whose 2024 presidential campaign benefited from the consolidated support of a formidable majority-party alliance.

The hegemony of this elite coalition inexorably precipitated a second critical precondition: the systematic enfeeblement of opposition forces. Both President Jokowi and Prabowo consistently articulated rhetorical frameworks emphasising national unity and political harmony—narratives that can be interpreted as a strategic disavowal of robust political contestation and opposition. Within Prabowo's administration, this tendency has reached unprecedented extremes: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)—remarkably, the victor in last year's legislative elections—stands as the sole political entity remaining beyond the perimeter of governmental power. This democratic anomaly is further exacerbated by emerging indications that PDI-P may ultimately integrate into Prabowo's administration or, employing the party's own diplomatic terminology, assume the role of 'government partner' within the legislature.

These twin political legacies, while superficially conducive to governmental stability, harbour profound constitutional and democratic vulnerabilities that have become increasingly manifest. The symbiotic relationship between executive dominance and legislative acquiescence has facilitated the passage of numerous legislative instruments, policy directives, and—most alarmingly—tacit acceptance of potential constitutional transgressions pertaining to electoral integrity and dynastic political entrenchment.

A third pivotal factor, materialising during the twilight of President Jokowi's administration, completes this political inheritance: the crystallisation of increasingly sophisticated and coordinated public dissent. Throughout Jokowi's presidency, the sole significant instance of mass mobilisation occurred during the '212 movement' of 2016-2017, which was ultimately neutralised through calibrated elite-level negotiations, organisational dismantling, and strategic detention of movement leadership. The subsequent period witnessed a striking absence of sustained, systematic opposition to governmental authority—a vacuum further reinforced by the sociopolitical constraints imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, which substantially inhibited civil society mobilisation.

The resurgence of critical collective action emerged precisely at the juncture of power transition from Jokowi to Prabowo, most notably through the nationwide 'Emergency Warning' demonstrations, which sought to contest perceived constitutional infractions and defend the integrity of regional electoral processes. A distinctive characteristic of the 'Emergency Warning' movement was its remarkable sociopolitical breadth, aggregating participants across diverse demographic and occupational spectra: from cultural celebrities to vocational students, university scholars to comedic performers. As we shall examine in the following section, this unprecedented coalition of public sentiment has not merely persisted but intensified precisely as formal authority was transferred to Prabowo's administration.


Three Critical Arguments

The dual political legacies of Jokowi's administration—ostensibly serving as architectural blueprints for governance sustainability—ultimately compelled Prabowo to adopt a strategy of replication and amplification. This manifested in two distinct yet interrelated approaches: the calculated expansion of coalition partnerships and the strategic incorporation of former opposition entities. Implementing the first approach, the Prabowo administration enacted a substantial proliferation of ministerial and deputy ministerial positions, alongside the establishment of numerous bureaucratic agencies, with appointments predominantly allocated to representatives from constituent coalition parties. The prospect of meaningful opposition was systematically eliminated as former electoral adversaries were integrated into the executive structure, assuming positions of significant governmental authority. This reconfiguration engendered a pervasive confidence within the political establishment that all institutional mechanisms necessary for effective governance had been definitively secured.

Notwithstanding these calculated political manoeuvres, the past year has witnessed the emergence of three interconnected waves of significant public protest: the 'Emergency Warning' demonstrations of August 2024, the 'Dark Indonesia' movement of February 2025, and most recently, the widespread mobilisation against proposed military legislation in March 2025. These sequential manifestations of civic discontent have precipitated three distinct yet complementary theoretical interpretations.

The first analytical framework identifies a fundamental crisis in governmental communication architecture. Superficially, this perspective might appear reductionist, seemingly collapsing complex political dynamics into mere communicative dysfunction. However, dismissing this interpretation as simplistic would constitute an analytical error. Contemporary media documentation has assiduously chronicled numerous instances wherein governmental representatives and political elites have systematically minimised public concerns, and in certain contexts, actively delegitimised them. The recent conduct of the Head of the Presidential Communication Office—who conspicuously trivialised credible allegations regarding intimidation of journalists—exemplifies this pattern. Similarly revealing was the administrative reluctance to facilitate public access to the draft military legislation, a procedural opacity that catalysed rather than mitigated public suspicion. Thus, what presents superficially as communicative inadequacy reveals, upon closer examination, a profound institutional capacity deficit.

The second theoretical framework posits a crisis of authentic leadership, with Prabowo's executive authority ostensibly constrained by the expansive coalition he has cultivated. While this interpretation offers compelling insights regarding the perils of governance without robust opposition, it suffers from an internal contradiction: it characterises Prabowo as simultaneously powerful enough to orchestrate a grand coalition yet insufficiently autonomous to exercise independent judgment within it. This analytical tension undermines the framework's explanatory power. More accurately, President Prabowo retains substantial constitutional prerogatives in coalition formation, affording him considerable latitude in power distribution and governance architecture. His consistent articulation of 'political reconciliation' and national unity narratives since the electoral campaign suggests that the grand coalition strategy represented a deliberate policy choice rather than an externally imposed constraint. If the administration anticipated enhanced governmental agility through such a structurally unwieldy coalition, this calculation reflects a profound strategic miscalculation. The maintenance of such an arrangement necessitates perpetual coordination and coalition management—a resource-intensive endeavour that inevitably diverts governmental capacity from substantive policy implementation.

The third interpretive framework, which acquires particular salience in this context, identifies the systematic erosion of meritocratic principles through coalition-based patronage distributions—a process initiated prior to the formal establishment of the administration. This dynamic creates conditions wherein policy contradictions become not merely possible but probable. A striking dissonance emerges between President Prabowo's rhetorical commitment to transparent, merit-based governance and the empirical reality observable to the public: the meteoritic ascension of a military aide to ministerial authority while retaining active military status; the appointment of social media influencers to governmental advisory positions absent demonstrable qualification; and the installation of ministerial officials manifestly lacking requisite expertise or professional credentials.

While these three theoretical frameworks offer distinct analytical perspectives, they converge in accelerating the third political legacy previously identified: the consolidation of civil society protest movements. Following a protracted period of relative quiescence, contemporary civil society mobilisation has discovered unprecedented motivational impetus. This is driven initially by class-based grievances that have intensified through successive instances of elite privilege, exemplified by remarkable career trajectories that generate widespread social resentment. This discontent is further exacerbated by economic stressors, including tax burden increases and austerity measures implemented under the rubric of governmental efficiency, which have simultaneously impacted diverse societal segments. Rising unemployment figures since the year's commencement, coupled with increasingly prevalent narratives of university graduates accepting positions significantly below their qualification levels to sustain basic livelihood, have reinforced this sentiment.

The confluence of these three theoretical frameworks produces an inevitable sociopolitical consequence: the emergence of an intergenerational protest movement characterised by organisational sophistication, strategic coherence, and substantial numerical strength. Within the contemporary context of global political volatility, wherein analogous movements have demonstrated capacity to precipitate domestic political instability, all institutional stakeholders—particularly governmental authorities—must engage in immediate preparatory and ameliorative measures.

Indonesia's political turbulence does not exist in isolation but rather unfolds within a broader international landscape of democratic contestation and institutional crisis. Contemporaneous mass demonstrations in Serbia after collapse of the railway station canopy and against perceived governmental corruption, widespread protests across Turkey challenging electoral manipulation and democratic backsliding, and the profound global uncertainty accompanying the return of Trump's administration in the United States—with its implications for international trade, security alignments, and democratic norms—all constitute manifestations of a worldwide pattern of political volatility. This global context amplifies the significance of Indonesia's domestic political dynamics; as one of Asia's most consequential democracies, Indonesia's institutional stability—or lack thereof—reverberates well beyond its borders. The convergence of domestic grievances with international patterns of democratic fragility creates a particularly volatile political environment wherein governmental miscalculations carry heightened risk of systemic disruption.

Indeed, with even modest political foresight, the Prabowo administration should have anticipated with unequivocal clarity that the inherited political preconditions and legacies would, without significant structural reformation, inevitably culminate in precisely such a political crisis.



Friday, February 7, 2025

The Cost of Consensus: Prabowo's 100 Days of Political Gluttony and Fiscal Fasting



In Indonesian politics, we seem to be experiencing what medical professionals might delicately call a case of institutional constipation. The body politic, swollen with the largest cabinet in our history—48 ministers and 56 deputy ministers—appears to be struggling with its basic functions. Like an overtaxed digestive system, the government has grown too large too quickly, gorging itself on political appointments and coalitions, while simultaneously attempting a puzzling feat: a massive Rp 306.69 trillion budget cut that seems to squeeze every ministry except its own bloated core. The symptoms are familiar to anyone who's ever suffered this uncomfortable condition: things move slowly, if at all, pressure builds up, and everyone pretends not to notice the obvious discomfort. The absence of meaningful opposition in parliament only adds to this peculiar political ailment—there's no natural mechanism to help things flow smoothly. President Prabowo's first 100 days present us with this paradox: a government that has expanded to unprecedented size while simultaneously trying to tighten its belt, creating a kind of institutional gridlock that nobody wants to discuss in polite company, but that we ignore at our peril.

The surgical precision with which Prabowo has wielded his budget-cutting scalpel would be almost admirable if it weren't so bewildering. Through Presidential Instruction No. 1/2025, he has prescribed a harsh diet for the bureaucracy—switching off air conditioners, herding civil servants into shared spaces lit only by natural light, and treating business travel as if it were a luxury spa treatment that must be rationed. The Finance Minister, Sri Mulyani, typically known for her steady hand at the tiller, now finds herself in the peculiar position of explaining why government offices must operate like austere monasteries while the cabinet continues to expand like a bureaucratic universe after the Big Bang. The stated purpose, we're told, is to redirect funds to Prabowo's flagship Free Nutritious Meals program, a noble cause that somehow requires both the largest cabinet in Indonesian history and civil servants working in semi-darkness. It's as if the government is attempting to diet while simultaneously preparing for a feast, counting calories with one hand while adding extra place settings with the other.

The most fascinating aspect of this fiscal theatrics isn't just the numbers—though Rp 306.69 trillion in cuts would make anyone's eyes water—but the political choreography behind it. While ministries scramble to slash their budgets by up to 58% in some cases, Prabowo has assembled what amounts to a political Noah's Ark, with nearly every party comfortably aboard his government vessel. The Interior Ministry cuts 57.46% of its budget while learning to love natural lighting, but apparently can't trim a single position from the unprecedented array of 104 ministers and deputy ministers. This isn't just regular political accommodation; it's political gluttony dressed up as fiscal responsibility. The opposition, what little existed of it, has been effectively digested into this expansive governmental body, leaving Indonesia's democracy in the curious position of having its largest-ever government and its smallest-ever opposition. It's as if we've built the most expensive consensus money can buy, only to discover we can't afford to keep the lights on.


Opposition forces

In the midst of this grand budgetary purge, one institution remains curiously untouched by the spirit of austerity: the parliament itself. While civil servants across Jakarta huddle in dimly lit offices and count their remaining business trip allowances like precious pearls, our representatives in the DPR continue their activities unperturbed by such earthly concerns as budget cuts. It's a telling exemption that speaks volumes about the current power dynamics in our democracy—those tasked with scrutinising the government's belt-tightening apparently don't need to tighten their own belts.

This parliamentary immunity to austerity might be more palatable if it came with robust oversight and vigorous debate. Instead, we're witnessing what might be the most compliant parliament in recent memory. The same political arithmetic that produced our supersized cabinet has effectively neutered parliamentary opposition. When the government announced its sweeping budget cuts, the response from parliament wasn't scrutiny or skepticism, but rather an eerie silence that would make a monastery seem rowdy by comparison. The Free Nutritious Meals program, despite its enormous price tag and complex implementation challenges, sailed through parliamentary discussions with barely a whisper of questioning. It's as if our legislative branch has transformed from a check on executive power into an elaborate rubber-stamping mechanism.

The implications for Indonesian democracy are profound and potentially long-lasting. When Terry Karl wrote about "imposed transitions" in 1990, he probably didn't envision a scenario where democratic institutions would be hollowed out not through outright authoritarianism, but through a kind of political osmosis—where opposition is absorbed rather than suppressed, and where acquiescence is bought with cabinet positions rather than enforced through coercion. The result is a peculiar form of democratic constipation where the normal push and pull of political debate, the healthy tension between government and opposition that keeps democracy regular and functioning, has been replaced by a kind of institutional paralysis masked as consensus. We've created a political system that's too bloated to move effectively but too well-fed to complain.

As we assess these first 100 days of Prabowo's presidency, we find ourselves in the grip of a peculiar political paradox. On the surface, we see a government preaching fiscal discipline while practicing political extravagance—a contradiction that would be comical if it weren't so consequential. The president's simultaneous moves to slash spending while maintaining the most bloated cabinet in Indonesian history isn't just an administrative curiosity; it's a symptom of a deeper democratic malaise. When civil servants are told that working in dark offices is an expression of patriotism while dozens of deputy ministers enjoy their new positions, we must question what kind of governance model is being constructed before our eyes.

The prescription for our current political constipation isn't simply more opposition for opposition's sake, nor is it blind acceptance of a government that speaks of efficiency while practicing excess. What Indonesia needs is a return to genuine democratic discourse—where budget cuts can be debated on their merits, where cabinet appointments serve governance rather than political accommodation, and where opposition isn't seen as an obstacle to be absorbed but as a vital component of democratic health. The risk we face isn't just fiscal inefficiency or administrative bloat; it's the gradual normalisation of a political system where consensus is manufactured through coalition-building rather than earned through debate and deliberation.

As Prabowo's government moves beyond its first 100 days, the true test won't be how much money it saves on electricity bills or how many civil servants it can fit into a sunlit room. The real challenge will be whether it can resolve the fundamental contradiction at its core: a government that grows larger while demanding others grow smaller, that preaches austerity while practicing excess, and that speaks of efficiency while embodying its opposite. Until then, Indonesia's democracy remains in an uncomfortable position—overfed but undernourished, expanding yet constrained, and desperately in need of the kind of political fiber that only genuine opposition can provide.


Tuesday, February 4, 2025

The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia’s Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045 (article for The Carter Center, 04 February 2025)

 


My latest article published by The Carter Center as part of an exciting new series "Beneath the Winds: The U.S.-China Rivalry from Southeast Asia" in The Monitor:

https://uscnpm.org/2025/02/04/the-price-of-tomorrow/

My piece, "The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia's Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045," examines the complex dynamics of China's massive investment in Indonesia's nickel industry and its far-reaching implications for our environment, society, and economic sovereignty. This article is part of a crucial initiative to amplify Southeast Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China rivalry. 

Friday, November 29, 2024

Podcast People, Power, Politics

 


Excited to share my perspective on the latest episode (#25) of CEDAR's TagarPeoplePowerPolitics podcast! 🎙️
Duncan McCargo and I discussed our Journal of Democracy paper 'Southeast Asia's Toxic Alliances.' It was a great opportunity to explore and share our research findings on the complex political dynamics in Southeast Asia.
Special thanks to Petra Alderman for hosting such an engaging conversation! 

https://newbooksnetwork.com/how-are-southeast-asias-toxic-alliances-undermining-the-regions-prospects-for-democracy 

Friday, October 25, 2024

Prabowo and His Huge Political Debts to Jokowi

 

In the early days of Prabowo Subianto's presidency, his leadership approach is drawing attention for its distinctly military-like undertones, especially within his new ministerial cabinet, namely Red and White cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih). As the former military general settles into his civilian role, Prabowo has introduced his Cabinet to a retreat at the Military Academy in Magelang, a setting rich with Indonesia's resistance history, where ministers and high-ranking officials engage in military-style drills and dawn awakenings led by bugle calls. It is somewhat attractive for public. It revives Prabowo old nationalist narratives. In mainstream media, we saw how most reports hailed such interesting approach.

While Prabowo has clarified that his intent isn't to militarise civilian governance (only for teamwork-building, discipline and so on, he said…), but such unusual approach highly connected to what Prabowo trying to say to us: this is my style, my government, so be it. So, this is one thing that might reflect a much deeper than only a cosmetical performance of military-style retreat: a strong intention to bring forth Prabowo’s own brand, his roots, his authenticity. We know this is a big problem for Prabowo as he for sure in huge political debts to Jokowi, the man who brought him into government in 2019, and later risked and gambled his reputation to paved the way for Prabowo and Gibran (Jokowi’s eldest son) victory in the 2024 presidential contest. 

This sort of military aesthetics and theatrical of Prabowo's early presidential performance, while striking in its imagery, is thereby an important move for his brand. The military-style retreat at Magelang's Military Academy, complete with dawn bugle calls and formation drills, operates within a carefully curated environment where ministers still enjoy executive amenities, support staff, and high-end accommodations. This theatrical departure from Jokowi's civilian-oriented leadership style appears to be Prabowo's attempt to reclaim his previously dominant military persona: it’s a contradictory picture from his recent public image as the gentle, dance-prone "gemoy" (cuddly) grandfather figure that emerged during his alliance with Jokowi. 

But this also presents a paradox: Prabowo leads an administration heavily indebted to his predecessor's political architecture, with retained ministers and coalition partners creating a complex web of obligations. The unprecedented scope of Prabowo's presidential authority, commanding Indonesia's largest-ever cabinet with 48 ministers and 88 additional high-ranking officials, is part of the debt itself. While on paper this extensive administration grants him extraordinary reach across Indonesia's political and economic landscape, the reality is more complex: this massive political machine was largely engineered through Jokowi's carefully orchestrated support system. The retention of 17 ministers from Jokowi's administration, the presence of Jokowi's son as Vice President, and the intricate web of political alliances forged during the transition period all point to a presidency that, despite its formal authority, operates within the framework of its predecessor's design.

This complex inheritance presents Prabowo with a fundamental challenge of political identity and autonomous leadership. His attempts to assert distinctiveness through military-style leadership theatrics and disciplined governance rhetoric show a deeper struggle to establish an authentic presidential persona independent of Jokowi's influence. The extended transition period from February to October 2024 further complicates this dynamic, as it allowed for deep entrenchment of continuity mechanisms that, while ensuring stability, potentially constrain Prabowo's ability to forge his own path.

Moreover, this complex patron-client dynamic raises fundamental questions about the nature of executive power in contemporary Indonesia. The presence of Jokowi's allies in key positions, while providing stability and continuity, potentially creates a dual power structure where presidential decisions must navigate both formal authority and informal obligations.

Therefore, rather than see it as a revival of neo-military-led political style and authoritarianism in Indonesian politics (which maybe true), the resurgence of Prabowo's military-influenced leadership style, while seemingly theatrical, may serve a crucial purpose in gradually distinguishing his presidency from Jokowi's populist-technocratic model. The carefully choreographed military ceremonies, dawn assemblies, and disciplined routines at the Magelang retreat represent more than mere spectacle—they constitute a deliberate attempt to reshape public perception and create psychological distance from Jokowi's more informal governance style.

However, the ultimate success of this rebranding strategy—and indeed, of Prabowo's presidency itself—will depend on his ability to transform symbolic gestures into substantive governance outcomes. The journey from being Jokowi's successor to becoming a distinctive president in his own right remains a work in progress, one where the military brand serves as just one tool in the broader challenge of crafting an authentic and effective leadership approach for Indonesia's complex political landscape.


Saturday, July 27, 2024

Partocracy in Regional Election (Op-ed Kompas, 27 July 2024)

Have you ever been confused by the inconsistent maneuvers of our political elites? They support each other one moment, then swiftly change their stance to antagonism: new alliances form with former adversaries, while old partnerships crumble. This political dance, as intricate as it is perplexing, plays out across various electoral arenas. 

Here is my take on this depressing politics, published by Kompas: https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/07/25/partokrasi-dalam-pilkada 

Friday, July 5, 2024

Journal Publication, SOUTHEAST ASIA'S TOXIC ALLIANCES, Journal of Democracy (Duncan McCargo & Rendy Wadipalapa)

 We explore how 'toxic unity' rhetoric masks elite deals that subvert democracy without overt repression. Our research identifies seven key features of these alliances:

- Improbable bedfellows (e.g., Prabowo/Jokowi, Zahid/Anwar)

- Reputational whitewashing

- Clandestine deals (pardons, dropped cases)

- Hidden brokerage by behind-the-scenes actors

- Exclusionary agendas

- Discursive appeals

- Voter alienation 

These Faustian pacts demand critical scrutiny. They turn elections into tools for undermining democratic processes and boost influence of extraconstitutional powers.

Download the open access here: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/930431 

Thursday, February 22, 2024

OP-ED, My Critique of Ulil Abshar Abdalla's op-ed (Kompas 22/02/2024)

 



This is my op-ed, published by Kompas this morning, criticizing Ulil Abshar Abdalla's article (15/02) about Prabowo Subianto's victory, which is very simplistic, biased, and premature. My writing dissects the fallacies in Ulil's thinking, as he presented three controversial propositions: 1) that the issue of democratic decline seems to be an elitist concern only; 2) that Prabowo's victory proves the broad public's preference for a continuity narrative à la Jokowi rather than a narrative of 'change' and reform; and 3) that the resilience of Indonesian democracy is commendable enough, and the death of democracy is an impossibility. The three propositions are very problematic because they overlook many factors. 

https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/02/20/sesat-pikir-tentang-demokrasi-indonesia?open_from=Opini_Page

Tuesday, February 13, 2024

Preliminary Analysis of Indonesia's Upcoming Election: Key Considerations


As Indonesia gears up for its crucial election on 14 February 2024, the political landscape is abuzz with speculation and anticipation. With most surveys favoring Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming as the winner, a reflection on the post-election is needed to understand the various factors to be anticipated. This preliminary analysis will delve into three key checkpoints that will likely shape the course of the election and its aftermath: the future opposition, the threat of united government, and the prospect of the rise of critical civil society--which insignificant for years under two tenure of Jokowi's administration.


Future Opposition Dynamics:

One of the critical aspects to observe is the potential emergence of a strong and significant opposition post-election. Among the prominent candidates – Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming, and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD – a careful assessment is required to determine who could effectively lead the opposition.

- Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Baswedan's alliance: With Anies Baswedan's experience as Jakarta's    governor and Muhaimin Baswedan's political acumen, they might form a formidable opposition, especially given their diverse backgrounds and appeal. However, there are reports suggesting that some elites within the Anies-Muhaimin coalition are preparing to build alliances not only with Ganjar’s side but also with Prabowo’s favoured side. Please remember: Muhaimin's PKB was and is still supporter of government and has insufficient experience outside the government's alliance. The prospect of opposition under Anies-Muhaimin’s umbrella is thereby still uncertain.

- Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming: This pair is the most unlikely candidate to win the contest. Instead, the question is: how will this pair set up their government alongside the opposition? If they adopt the winning formula of Jokowi, who offered numerous incentives and strategic positions to attract and weaken the opposition, how long and to what extent will this strategy be run and maintained?

- Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD's alliance: Ganjar Pranowo's party, PDI-P, and Mahfud MD's legal expertise might make them an attractive choice for those seeking a balanced opposition with a focus on institutional integrity. It remains to be seen how PDI-P envisions its future – is the party ready to be outside the government? To what extent is PDI-P preparing to be a formidable balancer of Prabowo-Jokowi alliances in the post-2024 election?


United Government and Alliances:

The concept of a "united government" and the continuation of Jokowi's policy approach through a big alliance are central themes in Prabowo's campaign. Understanding who will align with Prabowo's offer is crucial for predicting the political landscape post-election. The big alliance proposed by Prabowo suggests a broad-based coalition. Observers will need to closely monitor which political parties, interest groups, and influential figures decide to join this alliance, as it will significantly impact the stability and effectiveness of the future government.


Strengthening of Critical Civil Society:

Beyond the elites' contestation, the outcome of this election has the potential to influence the strengthening of critical civil society – a facet that may have been overshadowed during Jokowi's ten-year presidency. The role of civil society organisations, grassroots movements, and public engagement will be essential in shaping the broader socio-political environment. The election result may serve as a catalyst for increased civic participation and activism, as citizens respond to the policies and governance styles of the elected leaders. This could mark a significant shift in the dynamics between the government and civil society, impacting issues such as human rights, the manipulative pre-electoral process, and social justice.


As Indonesia stands at the precipice of a transformative election, these three key checkpoints provide a preliminary framework for understanding the potential outcomes and implications. The interplay between political leaders, alliances, and civil society will shape the trajectory of the nation in the post-election era.


Wednesday, November 29, 2023

Candidates and Youth Voters--OPINION-Jawa Pos (30/11/2023)

 Here is my latest perspective on the pragmatic, one-dimensional political campaigns of Indonesian presidential candidates in their approach to young voters, as published in Jawa Pos this morning. I argue that the obsessive rebranding from three pair candidates which are mostly having 'old, rusty, oligarchic' images to a new 'young, sporty, and relaxed' persona is perilous. This shift not only distracts the public from substantive debates but also represents a systematic and manipulative effort to obscure their track record and future plans.

Full article see here


Friday, October 6, 2023

Kaesang and PSI: diversifying the family dynasty (Indonesia at Melbourne blog, 3 October 2023)

 


My op-ed today, delves into the recent and significant political development in Indonesia—Kaesang Pangarep's affiliation with the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI)—and its potential implications for the nation's political landscape, particularly in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election.

Full article see here

Sunday, May 14, 2023

'Choosing the running mate for the 2024 presidential election' (OPINION-The Jakarta Post 15 May 2023)

 My op-ed this morning published by The Jakarta Post: 

'The current political landscape presents a stark contrast for two primary reasons. First, there is no political figure with dramatic, influential popularity as Jokowi had in his two races. Three names that appeared in many surveys put Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto and former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan in the lead by a significant margin. 

Second, the grand alliance formed under Jokowi’s umbrella has complicated matters. It confuses the allies’ members because within the grand alliance there are several names of presidential hopefuls: Prabowo, Ganjar and Golkar Party chairman Airlangga Hartarto. The sharp cleavage hit when the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) declared its own member, Ganjar, as its presidential pick, while Golkar and the Gerindra Party have proposed Airlangga and Prabowo respectively.'

Full op-ed please see this

By Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa



New Publication: Asian Studies Review (2026)

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