Showing posts with label Jokowi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jokowi. Show all posts

Saturday, August 2, 2025

When Clemency become Currency: Prabowo and his Clemency Gambit

 


On 1 August, 2025, Thomas "Tom" Lembong stepped out of Cipinang Prison while Hasto Kristiyanto walked free from KPK detention, both beneficiaries of President Prabowo Subianto's clemency. But this wasn't mercy—it was the most audacious political transaction in Indonesia's democratic era, disguised as a gesture of national unity.

The timing tells the story. Hours after their release, PDI-P held its long-delayed sixth congress at Bali Nusa Dua Convention Centre, an event that had been postponed multiple times since 2024. The party couldn't very well proceed with its most important organisational gathering while its Secretary-General sat in prison. And Prabowo solved that problem with surgical precision, ensuring Hasto's freedom coincided exactly with the congress that would reshape Indonesia's political landscape.

By evening, the transformation was complete. Megawati Soekarnoputri, reconfirmed as PDI-P leader, instructed her cadres to support Prabowo's government—a stunning reversal for Indonesia's largest ‘opposition’ party. The choreography was flawless: prison to congress to coalition in a single day. This level of coordination doesn't happen by accident; it's the result of months of careful negotiation where clemency became the ultimate bargaining chip.

Yet the two cases that Prabowo chose to resolve reveal something more troubling than mere political horse-trading: Indonesia's justice system has become a weapon of political control, capable of both manufacturing crimes and forgiving real ones depending on the political needs of those in power.

Consider Hasto's case first. Here was textbook corruption: he was convicted of providing Rp 600 million in bribes to secure Harun Masiku's parliamentary seat, a direct monetary exchange to manipulate democratic processes. Cash changed hands. Electoral integrity was compromised. Democracy itself was corrupted. If this isn't worthy of punishment, what is?

Tom Lembong's case, however, tells a different and more disturbing story. The judges explicitly stated he "had no criminal intent" and "did not receive personal benefits" from his sugar import decisions. He wasn't required to pay restitution precisely because he gained nothing personally. His "crime" was violating administrative procedures by granting import permits to private companies instead of state-owned enterprises—a policy decision dressed up as corruption.

This wasn't justice; it was the criminalisation of governance. Legal experts warned that Tom's conviction was "dangerous because it blurs the lines between administrative errors and criminal acts”, creating a chilling effect where ministers might fear making any controversial decisions. When policy disagreements become criminal cases, democracy dies a slow death in courtrooms.

The contrast couldn't be starker: a genuine corruptor who paid bribes to steal legislative seats, and a technocrat prosecuted for following presidential directives on trade policy. Yet both walked free on the same day...

Prabowo's calculation was brilliant in its cynicism. By freeing Tom, he sent a message to every technocrat and business leader who felt victimised by Jokowi's weaponisation of the justice system: align with me, and your legal troubles disappear. By freeing Hasto, he unlocked the door to PDI-P's institutional power and voter base. Two clemency decisions, two constituencies captured.

The former president's shadow looms large over this transaction. Prabowo's 20 July visit to Jokowi now appears less like courtesy and more like political conditioning, ensuring his predecessor wouldn't object to decisions that effectively repudiated his legacy of legal intimidation. Both Tom and Hasto represented opposition to Jokowi's reign—Tom as the technocrat who helped Anies Baswedan and questioned economic orthodoxy, Hasto as the party operative who challenged presidential authority.

The speed of the entire process betrayed its political nature. The DPR approved both requests on July 31, just one day after receiving them, with consultations held behind closed doors rather than in public debate. Even the announcement came late on a Thursday evening, designed to minimise media attention and public scrutiny. 

What makes this gambit particularly audacious is how Prabowo weaponised Indonesia's most cherished narratives. Officials claimed this was about national unity for the country's 80th independence anniversary, invoking patriotic sentiment to cover political manoeuvring. But the real celebration wasn't Indonesia's birthday—it was PDI-P's congress, where a formerly imprisoned party leader could seamlessly take his place in a new political order.

Perhaps most revealing is what this decision says about Prabowo's governing philosophy. Rather than working through democratic institutions to build consensus, he's demonstrating that presidential prerogative can override judicial decisions when politically convenient. This concentration of power might seem benevolent when used to correct prosecutorial overreach, but it fundamentally weakens the institutional foundations of Indonesian democracy.

The contrast with his predecessor is telling. Where Jokowi used legal institutions to exclude and intimidate political opponents, Prabowo is using clemency to include and co-opt them. It's a different approach to the same fundamental problem: how to manage political opposition in a democratic system. The question is whether Prabowo's inclusionary strategy represents mature democratic leadership or simply a more sophisticated form of authoritarian control.

The broader pattern emerging suggests that Prabowo views political opposition not as a healthy democratic force to be engaged through policy debate, but as a problem to be managed through transactional relationships. This reduces democratic politics to elite deal-making rather than principled competition over governing vision—a reality starkly illustrated by the seamless transition from Hasto's prison cell to PDI-P's congress podium.

For now, two convicted men walk free—one who deserved prosecution but received clemency, another who received prosecution but deserved clemency. In the gap between these two injustices lies a troubling truth: it has become a system where law serves power rather than justice, where clemency becomes currency, and where the president's political needs ultimately trump the courts' legal decisions. Whether this represents the maturation of Indonesian democracy or its corruption may depend on what Prabowo does with the considerable power he has now consolidated in his hands.


Monday, April 7, 2025

New Publication: Protecting two presidents: legislative decline in Indonesia's post-2024 election transition


Happy to share our recently published article--as we watch legislative manipulation unfold before our very eyes in Indonesia, this research couldn't be more timely. We discuss how Indonesia's parliament has transformed from a check on executive power into a tool for undermining democratic norms under the facade of parliamentary procedure. 

https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/HZ2YUX5NIFZY4DTZJFXV/full?target=10.1080/13572334.2025.2484488 

Please let me know if the link doesn't work--am more than happy to send you the Pdf. 

Tuesday, February 4, 2025

The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia’s Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045 (article for The Carter Center, 04 February 2025)

 


My latest article published by The Carter Center as part of an exciting new series "Beneath the Winds: The U.S.-China Rivalry from Southeast Asia" in The Monitor:

https://uscnpm.org/2025/02/04/the-price-of-tomorrow/

My piece, "The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia's Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045," examines the complex dynamics of China's massive investment in Indonesia's nickel industry and its far-reaching implications for our environment, society, and economic sovereignty. This article is part of a crucial initiative to amplify Southeast Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China rivalry. 

Saturday, January 25, 2025

New Publication (Cross-Party Presidential Dynasticism in Indonesia, Pacific Affairs, March 2025)

 


Excited to share that our article "Cross-Party Presidential Dynasticism in Indonesia" is now available as a pre-print in Pacific Affairs!

The article examines how President Jokowi's political dynasty is reshaping Indonesia's constitutional system through strategic coalition-building and institutional influence. 

The abstract is publicly available at: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/paaf/paaf, but full text is available only to subscribers.

I have a limited number of pre-print PDFs I can share with colleagues whose research aligns with these themes. If you're interested in receiving a copy, please send me email through rendypw@gmail.

Sunday, November 24, 2024

Jokowi vs Megawati 2.0: A Rematch and A Post-Presidential Power Play

 


In Indonesian political theater, the encore often proves as compelling as the main act. Former President Joko Widodo's recent political maneuvering presents precisely such a spectacle, as he embarks on an ambitious campaign to prove his enduring influence in Indonesian politics. Just weeks after stepping down from the presidency, Jokowi has thrown himself into regional elections with characteristic vigor, backing candidates in direct opposition to his former party, PDI-P, in what amounts to a high-stakes game of political chess with his former patron, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The stakes couldn't be higher. At its core, this is not merely about winning regional elections; it's about defining the post-presidential political landscape and determining who truly commands the loyalty of Indonesia's grassroots voters. Jokowi's aggressive endorsements of Ridwan Kamil for Jakarta and Ahmad Luthfi for Central Java represent more than mere political preferences—they are a direct challenge to PDI-P's traditional dominance and a bold statement about where power truly resides in Indonesian politics.

What makes this political drama particularly fascinating is its timing. Jokowi enters this fray having enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings during his presidency, backed by a devoted network of volunteers and a record of relative economic stability. Yet, he now operates without the formal trappings of presidential power. This presents a crucial test: Can Jokowi's personal brand, cultivated over a decade of pragmatic leadership, translate into raw political influence without the presidency's institutional backing?


Rematch: Jokowi vs Megawati 

Jokowi's enthusiastic campaign involvement may also stem from a deeper sense of frustration with the performance of his supported coalition. The "big-tent" approach—which brought together a bloated alliance of parties and political figures behind both Ridwan Kamil in Jakarta and Luthfi in Central Java—has thus far failed to generate the expected momentum. Recent polling data showing both candidates trailing their PDI-P-backed opponents suggests that merely assembling a broad coalition isn't enough to guarantee electoral success. This lackluster performance might explain Jokowi's decision to personally intervene, hoping that his direct involvement could provide the spark these campaigns desperately need. The situation eerily mirrors a common critique of such oversized coalitions: that they often prioritize elite accommodation over coherent messaging and grassroots mobilization. By stepping in personally, Jokowi appears to be attempting to compensate for the coalition's structural weaknesses with his own popular appeal—a high-risk strategy that simultaneously highlights both his potential influence and the limitations of traditional coalition politics.

The selection of battlegrounds is telling. Jakarta and Central Java aren't just any regions—they represent the very heart of Indonesia's political power structure. Jakarta, as the nation's capital and economic center, has always been a crucible for political ambitions. Central Java, meanwhile, stands as PDI-P's traditional stronghold, making Jokowi's intervention there particularly provocative. By backing Luthfi-Taj Yasin in what is essentially PDI-P's backyard, Jokowi is sending a clear message: no territory is off-limits in this power struggle.

But this gambit carries considerable risks. If his endorsed candidates fail to secure victories, it could severely diminish Jokowi's political capital at a crucial moment. The former president appears to be betting that his personal popularity—built on his trademark "blusukan" style of direct engagement with voters—can overcome the institutional advantages enjoyed by PDI-P's candidates. His recent campaign activities, from coffee shop meetings to market visits, suggest he's doubling down on the grassroots approach that defined his rise to power.

The conflict with Megawati and PDI-P adds another layer of complexity to this political chess match. Their relationship has evolved from one of political patronage to what appears to be open rivalry. This transformation reflects a broader tension in Indonesian politics between personal popularity and party machinery. Jokowi's decision to challenge his former party so directly suggests he believes his connection with voters transcends traditional party loyalties.

Yet, there's more at stake here than personal political capital. This power play could reshape Indonesia's political landscape for years to come. If Jokowi succeeds in demonstrating that his influence remains potent even after leaving office, it could establish a new model for post-presidential political engagement. Conversely, if his candidates falter, it might reinforce the traditional dominance of party structures over individual political brands.

The timing of these moves also hints at longer-term strategic considerations. With the 2029 presidential election already looming on the horizon, Jokowi's current maneuvering could be laying groundwork for future political plays. Success in these regional elections would position him as a kingmaker in national politics, potentially paving the way for his preferred candidates in future contests.

However, this strategy isn't without its critics. Some argue that Jokowi's aggressive involvement in regional elections so soon after leaving office risks undermining the democratic transition process. Others suggest that by opposing PDI-P so openly, he's burning bridges that might be needed for future political coalitions.

As Indonesia watches this political drama unfold, the fundamental question remains: Can Jokowi translate his unprecedented presidential popularity into lasting political influence? The answer will have profound implications for Indonesian democracy, potentially establishing new parameters for how former presidents can wield power in the post-presidential phase of their careers.

The coming weeks will prove crucial. As campaign seasons intensify and election day approaches, we'll see whether Jokowi's personal brand can truly transcend institutional power structures. Whatever the outcome, this bold political gambit has already reshaped the conversation about post-presidential influence in Indonesian politics.

For now, all eyes remain fixed on this high-stakes game of political chess, where a former president seeks to prove that even without the formal authority of office, his ability to shape Indonesia's political landscape remains undiminished. The results may well determine not just the future of regional leadership but the very nature of political influence in post-reform Indonesia.


Thursday, November 14, 2024

Against Indonesia’s toxic alliances (New Mandala, 13 November 2024)

 


My latest analysis on Indonesia's evolving political landscape, building upon my previous work with Duncan McCargo on toxic alliances in Southeast Asian politics.

For the first time since the fall of the New Order, we're witnessing what appears to be an opposition-free political landscape, where even major parties like PDI-P face systematic pressure to conform.
And the Jakarta gubernatorial race will be a crucial test: Can these toxic alliances maintain their effectiveness at the regional level as they did in national politics? 

https://www.newmandala.org/against-indonesias-toxic-alliances/ 

Friday, October 25, 2024

Prabowo and His Huge Political Debts to Jokowi

 

In the early days of Prabowo Subianto's presidency, his leadership approach is drawing attention for its distinctly military-like undertones, especially within his new ministerial cabinet, namely Red and White cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih). As the former military general settles into his civilian role, Prabowo has introduced his Cabinet to a retreat at the Military Academy in Magelang, a setting rich with Indonesia's resistance history, where ministers and high-ranking officials engage in military-style drills and dawn awakenings led by bugle calls. It is somewhat attractive for public. It revives Prabowo old nationalist narratives. In mainstream media, we saw how most reports hailed such interesting approach.

While Prabowo has clarified that his intent isn't to militarise civilian governance (only for teamwork-building, discipline and so on, he said…), but such unusual approach highly connected to what Prabowo trying to say to us: this is my style, my government, so be it. So, this is one thing that might reflect a much deeper than only a cosmetical performance of military-style retreat: a strong intention to bring forth Prabowo’s own brand, his roots, his authenticity. We know this is a big problem for Prabowo as he for sure in huge political debts to Jokowi, the man who brought him into government in 2019, and later risked and gambled his reputation to paved the way for Prabowo and Gibran (Jokowi’s eldest son) victory in the 2024 presidential contest. 

This sort of military aesthetics and theatrical of Prabowo's early presidential performance, while striking in its imagery, is thereby an important move for his brand. The military-style retreat at Magelang's Military Academy, complete with dawn bugle calls and formation drills, operates within a carefully curated environment where ministers still enjoy executive amenities, support staff, and high-end accommodations. This theatrical departure from Jokowi's civilian-oriented leadership style appears to be Prabowo's attempt to reclaim his previously dominant military persona: it’s a contradictory picture from his recent public image as the gentle, dance-prone "gemoy" (cuddly) grandfather figure that emerged during his alliance with Jokowi. 

But this also presents a paradox: Prabowo leads an administration heavily indebted to his predecessor's political architecture, with retained ministers and coalition partners creating a complex web of obligations. The unprecedented scope of Prabowo's presidential authority, commanding Indonesia's largest-ever cabinet with 48 ministers and 88 additional high-ranking officials, is part of the debt itself. While on paper this extensive administration grants him extraordinary reach across Indonesia's political and economic landscape, the reality is more complex: this massive political machine was largely engineered through Jokowi's carefully orchestrated support system. The retention of 17 ministers from Jokowi's administration, the presence of Jokowi's son as Vice President, and the intricate web of political alliances forged during the transition period all point to a presidency that, despite its formal authority, operates within the framework of its predecessor's design.

This complex inheritance presents Prabowo with a fundamental challenge of political identity and autonomous leadership. His attempts to assert distinctiveness through military-style leadership theatrics and disciplined governance rhetoric show a deeper struggle to establish an authentic presidential persona independent of Jokowi's influence. The extended transition period from February to October 2024 further complicates this dynamic, as it allowed for deep entrenchment of continuity mechanisms that, while ensuring stability, potentially constrain Prabowo's ability to forge his own path.

Moreover, this complex patron-client dynamic raises fundamental questions about the nature of executive power in contemporary Indonesia. The presence of Jokowi's allies in key positions, while providing stability and continuity, potentially creates a dual power structure where presidential decisions must navigate both formal authority and informal obligations.

Therefore, rather than see it as a revival of neo-military-led political style and authoritarianism in Indonesian politics (which maybe true), the resurgence of Prabowo's military-influenced leadership style, while seemingly theatrical, may serve a crucial purpose in gradually distinguishing his presidency from Jokowi's populist-technocratic model. The carefully choreographed military ceremonies, dawn assemblies, and disciplined routines at the Magelang retreat represent more than mere spectacle—they constitute a deliberate attempt to reshape public perception and create psychological distance from Jokowi's more informal governance style.

However, the ultimate success of this rebranding strategy—and indeed, of Prabowo's presidency itself—will depend on his ability to transform symbolic gestures into substantive governance outcomes. The journey from being Jokowi's successor to becoming a distinctive president in his own right remains a work in progress, one where the military brand serves as just one tool in the broader challenge of crafting an authentic and effective leadership approach for Indonesia's complex political landscape.


Saturday, July 27, 2024

Partocracy in Regional Election (Op-ed Kompas, 27 July 2024)

Have you ever been confused by the inconsistent maneuvers of our political elites? They support each other one moment, then swiftly change their stance to antagonism: new alliances form with former adversaries, while old partnerships crumble. This political dance, as intricate as it is perplexing, plays out across various electoral arenas. 

Here is my take on this depressing politics, published by Kompas: https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/07/25/partokrasi-dalam-pilkada 

Friday, July 5, 2024

Journal Publication, SOUTHEAST ASIA'S TOXIC ALLIANCES, Journal of Democracy (Duncan McCargo & Rendy Wadipalapa)

 We explore how 'toxic unity' rhetoric masks elite deals that subvert democracy without overt repression. Our research identifies seven key features of these alliances:

- Improbable bedfellows (e.g., Prabowo/Jokowi, Zahid/Anwar)

- Reputational whitewashing

- Clandestine deals (pardons, dropped cases)

- Hidden brokerage by behind-the-scenes actors

- Exclusionary agendas

- Discursive appeals

- Voter alienation 

These Faustian pacts demand critical scrutiny. They turn elections into tools for undermining democratic processes and boost influence of extraconstitutional powers.

Download the open access here: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/930431 

Thursday, May 9, 2024

The hope for Indonesia's oppositional forces (op-ed Kompas, 10/05/24)

 Indonesia needs strong opposition. But what kind of opposition? What is the possible, realistic projection of opposition amidst the aggressive promiscuous power-sharing and toxic alliance?

Here my latest op-ed published by Harian Kompas this morning (10/05):


Friday, October 6, 2023

Kaesang and PSI: diversifying the family dynasty (Indonesia at Melbourne blog, 3 October 2023)

 


My op-ed today, delves into the recent and significant political development in Indonesia—Kaesang Pangarep's affiliation with the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI)—and its potential implications for the nation's political landscape, particularly in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election.

Full article see here

Sunday, September 24, 2023

The Illusive National Unity (Opinion, Tempo, 22 September 2023)

 


The ‘national united’ vision campaigned by presidential candidates is, at some point, illusive. One should note that while this issue seems positively relevant to resolve Indonesia’s polarised society, it also brings a fascist mentality which destruct any political opposition. My view published by Tempo here

Friday, July 21, 2023

My op-ed on The Jakarta Post (21/07)

 


My view on the appointment of Budi Arie, the founder of PROJO, as Minister, and its implications on the current politics--published by The Jakarta Post (21/07). It may signal the President's intention to establish an independent stronghold that operates outside any formal and official political structure. Budi's appointment also adds pressure on PDI-P, pushing the party and its matriarch, Megawati, to reopen negotiations and bargaining with the ruling president.

Online link here

-Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa-

Tuesday, May 16, 2023

Elite's partisanship on Indonesian politics

 


My view on the president's partisanship, ahead of the 2024 election published by Tempo today, started with questions: How can actor with strong legitimacy—obtained directly through the mandate of the people and elections—intend to lower his own position to become partisan, bound, and involved in party political compromises? Is it indeed impossible to achieve absolute neutrality within the electoral and party systems of modern democracies?'

Full op-ed please see here

Tuesday, May 9, 2023

The "Party's officer" and Political Cartels (Kompas 10 May 2023)

 By Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa

Glad to share my op-ed published by Harian Kompas this morning. I discuss the big elephant in the room: Jokowi and his inferiority against PDI-P. Political cartels, a very common scheme played by Indonesian parties in the post-New Order settings, is one of the structural factors that need to be analysed.





Sunday, April 2, 2023

Crisis of oppositional figures (Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa, Koran Tempo, 3 April 2023)

 


We have a very limited number of presidential hopefuls who hold an oppositional and critical stance toward the current regime. The consequences of this are significant: Indonesia's electoral discourse is monolithic and lacks political vocabulary.
My op-ed is published by Tempo this morning:

https://koran.tempo.co/read/opini/481269/krisis-figur-calon-presiden-2024

Monday, March 20, 2023

TikTok and the Political Disinformation

 


My op-ed published by Jawa Pos this morning. I explore TikTok as the strategic means to proliferate political disinformation. We may also see this platform dominates Indonesian Gen Z in the upcoming election.

Friday, January 6, 2023

Continuing trend of Intolerance: Projection of the political year

 

My op-ed for The Jakarta Post, argues that intolerance and sectarianism remains a dominant feature within Indonesian society and politics in the upcoming election year.

See here

Tuesday, January 3, 2023

Conservative groups ahead of the 2024 election


Tempo​ published my op-ed this morning about the rising Islamist conservatism ahead of the election year. Despite being weakened by numerous regime's oppressive policies, the Islamist movement remains salient in current Indonesian politics. It is no surprise at all if, sooner or later, we see the presidential hopefuls begin flirting, approaching these groups. 

Full article read here

New Publication: Asian Studies Review (2026)

  Indonesia is now watching its police generals turn on each other over the alleged wiretapping of the President. In 2024, that same state m...